This paper provides a quantitative study of the main determinants of the Greek great depression since 2010. We use a medium-scale DSGE model calibrated to the Greek economy between 2000 and 2009 (the euphoria years that followed the adoption of the euro). Then, departing from 2010, our simulations show that the fiscal policy mix adopted, jointly with the deterioration in institutional quality and, specifically, in the degree of protection of property rights, can explain essentially all the total loss in GDP between 2010 and 2015 (around 26%). In particular, the fiscal policy mix accounts for 14% of the total output loss, while the deterioration in property rights accounts for another 8%. It thus naturally follows that a less distorting fiscal policy mix and a stronger protection of property rights are necessary conditions for economic recovery in this country.
Introduction
Following the world financial crisis in 2008, most European Union countries have managed to pull out of recession since 2014. A distinct exception is Greece which has not yet entered a recovery mode (see European Commission, 2016, and CESifo, 2016) . The Greek economy has been shrinking since 2009 and Greece has lost around 26% of its GDP over 2010-2015. Thus, the episode seems to satisfy all conditions of a "great depression" (see Kehoe and Prescott, 2002) . 1 Actually, and making it worse, the country is in a multiple crisis; public debt is around 177% of GDP, foreign debt is around 142% of GDP, unemployment is around 25% and there is still an environment of political uncertainty and polarization.
Despite three bailout packages of around 300 billion euros so far (financed by the European Union, the European Central Bank and the IMF), several structural reforms and the recent improvement in the international economic environment, Greece has not yet shown any sign of real recovery. Paradoxically, most of policymakers, both in Greece and the EU, have been searching for engines of economic growth, without having first studied the determinants of the continuing depression. The present paper tries to fill this gap. Identifying the barriers to growth is a prerequisite for credibly suggesting potential engines of growth. 2 In particular, the aim of the current paper is to decompose the above loss in output into its main drivers. Our main results are as follows. Using a medium-scale DSGE model carefully calibrated to the Greek economy, our simulations show that the fiscal policy mix adopted, jointly with developments in institutional quality, and specifically in the degree of protection of property rights, can explain around 85% of the total loss in GDP between 2010 and 2015. In particular, when we use the tax-spending mix as it has been in the data since 2010, and we also assume that the observed deterioration in an index of property rights manifests itself into a decline in total factor productivity, our model can explain around 22% fall in GDP since 2010 (as said, the total loss in the data has been around 26%). We also show that the portion due to the fiscal policy mix is 14%, while the portion due to the deterioration in property rights is another 8%.
Two clarifications are necessary from the outset. The first is about fiscal consolidation. Our results should not be interpreted as saying that most of the Greek crisis is a consequence of fiscal austerity. A kind of fiscal austerity was necessary, given the imbalances inherited from the past;
once sovereign risk premia emerged in 2010, Greek governments could not choose but undertake severe fiscal consolidation measures. Actually, as perhaps should be expected, when we simulate our model under the counter-factual scenario that fiscal policy had remained unchanged as in 2010, the model cannot deliver a dynamically stable solution implying an unsustainable fiscal situation, which, in simple words, means that the continuation of the status quo was not possible anymore and that some kind of fiscal stabilization was necessary. What our results do hint, however, is that the recessionary effects of fiscal stabilization could perhaps have been milder, had the policy mix been different from that actually adopted; Greece's fiscal stabilization has been based on both spending cuts and tax rises but the increase in taxes has been particularly high (see subsection 3.1 below).
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The second clarification is about institutional quality. The importance of institutional quality, and especially of property rights, for economic growth is well known in the growth literature (see e.g. Acemoglu, 2009 , chapter 4, for a review). It should be stressed that property rights may be affected by tax policy, but they are also affected by the quality of public order and safety, where the sharp deterioration of the latter is clearly documented in the Greek data since 2004 and, especially, after 2008 (see subsection 3.2 below). Thus, it should not come as a surprise, at least qualitatively, that this institutional deterioration is a driver of the Greek depression; on the other hand, our simulations show that its quantitative importance for the output loss is striking.
The way we work is as follows. We employ a medium-scale new-Keynesian DSGE model
of a small open economy enriched with a number of real and nominal frictions so as to capture the main empirical features of the Greek economy. 4 The model is calibrated to data up to and including the year 2009. We take 2009 as the pre-depression benchmark year because the first memorandum with the Troika (EU, ECB and IMF) was agreed in 2010. This first memorandum, as well as the next two in 2012 and 2015, have provided financial assistance and have offered credit to the Greek economy at much more favourable terms than markets would have provided, but they have been "conditioned on" fiscal austerity measures (namely, measures to improve debt dynamics) and structural reforms that have been highly criticized and have led to political polarization and social unrest. Then, departing from 2010 and assuming an initial unanticipated shock to public debt as observed in the data during that year, we simulate the effects of the tax-spending mix, as it has been in the actual data during 2010-2015, so as to quantify the portion of the output loss caused by this particular policy mix. In turn, we repeat the same exercise by adding the effects of the deterioration in the property rights index, again as it has been in the actual data up to 2015, by assuming that this deterioration affects the efficiency, or productivity, with which factor inputs are used (namely, it affects the so-called TFP). 5 Quoting Acemoglu (2009, p. 105) , "when countries have large drops in their income, due to political instability, etc., these drops are associated with corresponding declines in TFP".
A paper close to ours is Gourinchas et al. (2016) , who also use a micro-founded DSGE model to analyze the Greek crisis. In their paper, the crisis is driven by a large menu of shocks, including shocks to default rates, banks' funding costs, etc. We however believe that such variables can hardly be considered as (extrinsic) shocks. Here, by contrast, we try to identify the primitive sources of "shocks". 6 We show that the particular fiscal policy mix adopted and the deterioration in institutional quality, both as documented in the actual time-series data, can explain most of the drop in output since 2010.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, explains its calibration and presents the steady state solution. Section 3 presents simulations. Section 4 closes the paper.
Technical issues are in a detailed Appendix, which is available in the companion working paper (see Economides et al., 2017 ).
A DSGE model
In this section, we describe the model used and provide its numerical steady state solution. The latter will serve as a point of departure for the simulations in the next section
Description of the model
Our quantitative results will be based on a medium-scale DSGE model of a small open economy calibrated to Greek data. The model is a variant of the model used by the Bank of Greece (see Papageorgiou, 2014) . We choose to work with this particular model because it is used by an official institution, like the Bank of Greece, and also because it is relatively detailed and hence can capture the main features of the Greek macro economy.
The model exhibits a number of real and nominal frictions so as to capture the key features of the Greek economy and thus provide a parameterized general equilibrium model suitable for policy simulations. These frictions include imperfectly competitive labor and product markets, the distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian households, real wage rigidity, Calvo-type shortterm nominal fixities, habit persistence, various adjustment costs, a variety of firms so as to capture tradable and non-tradable goods, a relatively rich public sector including the production of public goods/services by the use of public employees, loss of monetary policy independence since Greece is part of the euro zone and also an imperfect world capital market where the interest rate at which domestic agents borrow from the world capital market rises with public debt.
The building blocks of the model, the optimization problems of economic agents and the final equilibrium system are presented in Appendix A. As shown there, the final equilibrium system consists of 89 equations in 89 endogenous variables. This is given the exogenously set policy instruments, initial conditions for the state variables and total factor productivity (TFP) in the two sectors, tradables and non-tradables. Using these numerical values, the system is then solved using a Newton-type non-linear method as implemented in DYNARE (see below for specification of transition dynamics). Its steady state solution (at least for the key variables) is reported in Table 1 . In this solution, we have exogenously set the debt-to-GDP ratio equal to the threshold level 126% d ≡ , which was the value of the public debt-to-GDP in 2009 (that was the year that risk premia emerged in Greece), so that one of the remaining fiscal policy instruments needs to be determined residually to satisfy the within period government budget constraint; we assume that it is lump-sum taxes that play this role.
Numerical solution of the model
As Table 1 shows, the solution is in line with data averages over 2000-2009 and can thus provide a reasonable departure point for the changes that have been taking place since 2010 and are described in the next sections. In particular, the solution does a relatively good job at mimicking the position of the country (and its different sectors) in the international capital market, as well as the consumption-investment behavior of the private sector over the euro pre-crisis years. (ii) A positive value of the net foreign liabilities-to-GDP ratio means that the domestic country is a net borrower.
Simulations
As said above, departing from the "steady state" solution in Table 2 , we will now simulate the above economy when fiscal policy and institutional quality change as observed in the data after 2010. To understand how the model works, we will start by assuming that only fiscal policy has changed and then we will add changes in institutional quality. That is, we study one dynamic driver at a time.
Effects of the fiscal austerity mix as adopted in practice
In this subsection, we will examine, other things equal, the impact of fiscal consolidation policies as adopted in Greece since 2010.
We work as follows. We assume that in 2010 there was an initial shock/increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio by 20 pp (as observed in the data). We then set all exogenous fiscal (taxspending) instruments as they have actually been in the data during 2010-15 (to isolate the impact of actual fiscal policy, we switch-off the extra feedback reaction to public debt during this subperiod). Besides, in order to mimic the memorandum package, we set the interest rate, at which the government borrows from abroad, as a weighted average of the risk-free world interest rate and the world interest rate that the economy would face if it had to borrow from the international capital market (the latter includes the country risk-premium as in the data). 8 The private sector, on the other hand, continues to face the full world interest rate (that includes the country risk-premium) when it borrows from the international market. Recall that this premium is a function of the public debt gap, where, in this gap, the public debt threshold above which premia emerge is 126%.
We will assume that all the above features continue until the year 2015 (this is the year that this paper is being written in terms of data availability). Then, after 2015, the fiscal instruments are assumed to gradually return to their pre-crisis 2009 values. In particular, we assume that they follow an autoregressive process using as initial values the 2015 values and an autoregressive coefficient equal to 0.9. We allow one fiscal instrument to react to the public debt gap (see equation 27), where, in this gap, the public debt target in the policy rules is the pre-shock value of 126%. The interest rate at which the government borrows from abroad is now allowed to react fully to the degree of government's indebtedness.
Thus, in our first simulations, transition dynamics is driven by the above changes in fiscal policy. We solve the model under perfect foresight (as said above, we use a Newton-type non-linear method as implemented in DYNARE).
The simulated impulse response functions are plotted in Figure 1 , while Table 2 summarizes the associated changes in the main macro variables vis-à-vis their values in the data. Inspection of the simulated results in the third column of Table 2 , and comparison to the actual data in the second column, implies that the GDP decreases by around 14% between 2009 and 2015. In the data, the actual decrease has been 26% during the same time interval. That is, the particular fiscal austerity package, which has been adopted between 2010 and 2015, can account for more than half of the big fall in output observed in the data during this period.
Figure 1: Impulse response functions driven by the fiscal austerity package
Note: All variables are expressed as percentage deviations from the steady-state, with the exception of the CPI inflation, the interest rate, foreign assets and the public debt-to-GDP ratio that are expressed as percentage point deviations. Finally, we close by reporting that the model would be dynamically unstable (meaning that there is no solution) if we had assumed that the independently set fiscal policy instruments remained as they were in the pre-2010 period. In other words, as said in the Introduction, the fiscal situation was not sustainable and hence some kind of fiscal policy adjustment was unavoidable in the aftermath of the 2008 world crisis.
Effects of the deterioration in institutional quality
We will now add another driver of transition dynamics, namely, changes in institutional quality and, in particular, an index that measures the protection of property rights.
As said in the Introduction, we assume that developments in this index manifest themselves as shocks to TFP. This is a short cut and is similar to the methodology of Chari et al. (2007) . In other words, as a short cut, we construct an "effective" TFP series, where the degree of effectiveness is shaped by changes in the degree of property rights protection. On the other hand, it should be stressed that it is straightforward to enrich our model so as, in the presence of weak 
Lump-Sum Taxes
property rights, atomistic agents find it to optimal to allocate effort to conflict and extraction, and, in equilibrium, this leads to resource misallocation that eventually reduces the effective TFP; in Appendix B, we provide a simple version of our full-fledged DSGE model that shows this equivalence formally. 9 Chari et al. (2007) also work with a prototype economy with wedges, or adverse shocks, and then show that micro-founded frictions in a more detailed economy manifest themselves as such wedges, or adverse shocks, in the prototype economy.
We therefore proceed as follows. First, we construct a series of institutional quality. Then, using this, we will construct a corresponding series for the effective TFP and, finally, will feed this resulting TFP series into our theoretical model in section 2. That is, now the model's dynamics will be driven both by the fiscal austerity package and the effective TFP series.
To construct a measure of the quality of institutions that protect property rights, we use the World Bank's "Worldwide Governance Indicators" dataset, which has been widely used in many empirical studies (see e.g. Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) and Baldacci et al. (2011) ). The institutional quality index is the sum of the following three indicators: "rule of law", "regulatory Note: The index is computed as the sum of the following three indicators: "rule of law", "regulatory quality" and "political stability and absence of violence/terrorism". The data source is Worldwide Governance Indicators, World DataBank.
In turn, as said above, we assume that changes in the TFP level are "shaped" by changes in the above index of institutional quality. In the model, there are two specific TFP levels, namely, in the tradable and the non-tradable sector. We allocate the changes over time in this index to the respective TFPs according to the relative size of the tradable and non-tradable sectors in the data (the ratio of the gross value added in the tradable sector to the non-tradable sector is 0.8). Thus, we obtain time series for the TFP levels in the two sectors and we normalize them so that their values in 2009 to be consistent with the calibrated values of the TFPs (equal to 1 for the non-tradable and equal to 0.9241 for the tradable sector). Figure 4 shows the two constructed effective TFP series. Finally, using all the above, we repeat the same experiment as in section 3.1 by setting the TFP levels of tradables and non-tradables over 2010-2015 equal to the constructed series. The new impulse response functions are plotted in Figure 5 , while the last column in Table 2 , which was presented above, summarizes the associated changes in the main macro variables. Notice that now the reduction in GDP in column 3 of Table 2 is 22%, as compared to only 14% without the TFP/institutional shock in column 2. 
Conclusions, discussion and extensions
In this paper, we studied the quantitative importance of the fiscal austerity program and the deterioration of institutional quality, both as observed in the recent data, for the Greek great depression since 2010. The main result is that the adopted fiscal policy mix and the deterioration in property rights are the main explanatory variables of the Greek great depression.
We close with acknowledging two caveats. First, here we did not explain why the specific fiscal policy mix has been chosen (which proves to be particularly distorting) or why the society has chosen to have weak and deteriorating property rights (which leads to misallocation of resources and hence to a relatively low TFP). In general, it is well recognized that the policies chosen and/or the way resources are (mis)allocated are an equilibrium outcome of a political process interacting with institutions and distribution (see e.g. Acemoglu (2009, chapter 4) and Jones (2011) ). In the case of Greece, there is no shortage of conjectures about the root causes of such choices which go back to the post-world war II history of the country. Second, our analysis here was only positive.
One could search, for instance, for alternative fiscal policy mixes and/or institutional regimes that could perhaps mitigate the recessionary effects of debt consolidation. We leave these extensions for future research.
